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Abstract  
Contrary to the opinion of some scholars which holds that science is independent of 
particular worldviews in its presuppositions and method, this paper argues that although 
the presuppositions of science have no worldview content, science may provide evidence 
that has a bearing on a certain worldview . This dependence on a worldview is what gives 
science some level of political autonomy; that is, some kind of scientific citizenship in 
philosophy that gives credence to a form of local knowledge, and thus, gives voice to a 
group of people. This is very important as science and technology is not just about doing 
or making by hand; it involves not only human activities, but also the skills of the crafts-
man or woman, which does not leave out the art of the human mind that does the 
manufacturing. It is on this basis that this paper studies Igwebuike as the basis for 
science and technology in Africa. Igwebuike falls within the parameters of the art of the 
African mind. It shapes the African thinking as it is the basis of the African logic. At this 
point, science and technology become a revelation of the Igwebuike framework. This piece, 
therefore, studied how Igwebuike impacts on science and technology through its 
determination of the logic (nka) employed in science and technology. It discovered that 
the African worldview conceptualized in Igwebuike is capable of a science that is 
anchored on the structure of the African world. For the purpose of this study, the 
Igwebuike complementary method of inquiry was employed. 




Scholars like Cherry (1965) and Okonkwo (2012) observe the importance of a 
people’s language and worldview in the shaping of their thoughts, including 
thoughts and developments in the areas of religion, philosophy, science, 
technology, among others. He writes: 
The language of a people largely constrains their thoughts. Its words, 
concepts and syntax, out of all the signs that people use, are the most 
important determinant of what they are free and able to think. It makes 
their particular epistemology, their special view of the world, and what 
they notice or do not notice, (p. 73). 
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It is in this regard that Fuller (cited in Okonkwo, 2012) speaks of a scientific 
citizenship in philosophy that should be “designed to give credence to a form of 
local knowledge... to retain a certain level of political autonomy” (p. 73). The 
implication of this is that every language community has its own science and 
technology, which should be integrated into what is now known as technology. 
This, according to Okonkwo (2012), would deepen ordinary democratic franchise 
by giving voice to a group of people.  
 
Moreover, if science is understood as “an organized, systematic enterprise that 
gathers knowledge about the world and condenses the knowledge into testable 
laws and principles” (Wilson 1998, p. 58), and in the perspective of Afisi (2016) 
“as the concerted human effort to have a clear understanding of the history of the 
natural world, and how the natural world works, with observable physical 
evidence as a basis for that understanding” (p. 59), it then implies that peoples 
and societies, both local and advanced rational and intellectually open societies, 
are capable of science, even if it might not be in full accord with what the West 
has developed as science. Beyond the reality of pluralism in the world, science 
has a social character that makes it part of social and cultural traditions, and it is 
at this point that we can speak of particular worldviews as characterising 
different sciences. It is also within this context that Igwebuike philosophy of 
science and technology is discussed. 
  
An understanding of technology makes profound the idea of the social character 
of science and technology. Technology is not just about doing or making by 
hand, it involves the skills of the crafts-man or woman, which involves the art of 
the human mind. The art of the human mind is shaped by particular worldviews, 
and, therefore, the source of the influence of the worldview on science and 
technology. To understand the power of worldview on a particular science and 
technology, there is the need to go back to the definition of technology. 
Etymologically, it stems from the Greek techné, which designates “skill,” “art,” 
and “craft,” a mode of doing or making.  It is in this spirit that Plato understood 
politics as fundamentally belonging to the domain of techné, politics as first and 
foremost a political skill to be learned, an art or, better yet, a kind of technology 
of the polis.  Techné, in the original Greek usage, refers to both the skill or power 
of doing/making  and that which is performed, produced, or fabricated—in 
other words, techné  designates both art and artifice. From this perspective, techné 
(art/artifice) is opposed to physis (nature), most fundamentally in terms of 
causality.  Thus, techné implies a mediation by an external agent (Reason) to an 
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object in order to bring about change in it, which means that the principle of 
change is here foreign to the object (Nadal 2012).   
 
Technology is a product and performance of man’s dealings with physis through 
techné, the bridge is the materialization or actualization of an intended, desired 
end (Jean-Luc 2000). Thus, Heidegger (1977) writes that: “The manufacture and 
utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things 
themselves, and the [social] needs and ends that they serve, all belong to what 
technology is” (p. 288). It can be, therefore, said that science and technology only 
become a revelation or the bringing forth of what the art of the mind conceals.  
 
It is from the context of the dynamics of ‘the art of man’ and the ‘artifice’ that this 
work studies Igwebuike (which conceptualizes a worldview) as the basis for 
science and technology in Africa. Igwebuike falls within the parameters of the art 
of the African mind. It shapes the African thinking as it is the basis for African 
logic. From the forgoing, science and technology become a revelation of the 
Igwebuike framework. This piece would, therefore, study how Igwebuike impacts 
on science and technology through its determination of the logic (nka) of the 
scientific and technological. It argues that the African worldview conceptualized 
in Igwebuike is capable of a science,  notwithstanding that it is a predominantly 
religious worldview. What a worldview provides is the framework capable of 
responding to several questions at the same time, be it in the area of science, 
religion, politics, economics, etc. It is in this regard that worldview would be 
understood as a world of possibilities. 
 
Worldview as a Framework for Science/Technology 
Gauch (2007) o u t l i n e s  seven pillars that define and hold science. These 
pillars include: 
1. Realism: It holds that the world is real. If it were not real, then it cannot be 
studied or analyzed 
2. Presuppositions: It holds that the world is orderly and comprehensible. If it 
were not comprehensible, then it wouldn’t be studied by science. 
3. Evidence: This means that science requires empirical, public evidence for 
its conclusions.  
4. Logic: It holds that scientific thinking employs standard logic.  
5. Limits: It holds that science has limits; it cannot explain everything.  
6. Universality: This holds that science is open to all people from all cultures; 
in principle, anybody can engage in scientific activity.  
7. Worldview: This states that science contributes to a meaningful worldview.  
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Developing his thesis further, Gauch (2007) argues that science is independent of 
particular worldviews in its presuppositions and method. This notwithstanding, 
he avers that science can have worldview import. Interpreting the position of 
Gauch, Irzik and Nola (2009) write: 
We understand this as follows. Gauch believes that although the 
presuppositions of science and scientific method/reasoning have no 
worldview content, science may provide evidence that has bearing on a 
certain worldview belief, say p. Such evidence can be employed as a 
premise in an argument. Then using scientific reasoning (that includes 
standard logic), p is reached as a conclusion. Gauch seems to think that 
this is the only way science is relevant to worldview beliefs—if, that is, 
they can be obtained as the conclusion of an argument that contains 
evidence as one of its premises. Let us call this the argument–argument. 
(p. 735). 
 
Reacting to the position of Gauch, Irzik and Nola (2009) argue that science does 
have worldview content, even in its presuppositions and method. In other 
words, the scientific method is not worldview-independent. Thus, science, in 
the quite minimal sense, has worldview content in other respects as well.  
This content derives from its presuppositions that include its 
criticizability, logic, the orderliness and the comprehensibility of the 
world, from its method of inquiry and mode of explanation. Of course, 
science is also relevant to worldviews by also providing empirical 
evidence and then reaching conclusions that have worldview content. 
This is not to say that science can answer every worldview question, but 
it is a rich and powerful source of worldview beliefs. Furthermore, by 
challenging, confronting and conflicting with other worldviews, it forces 
their defendants to improve upon them. Natural theology, for instance, 
owes as much to science as it does to religion (p. 744). 
 
This position is based on the fact that the history of science reveals how it 
emerged from mythological and religious worldviews; using a remarkable 
episodes in the history of human kind, they made reference to the Scientific 
Revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries, which was highly influenced by 
philosophical and religious beliefs. Thus, from the above perspectives, it can be 
said that science, as a universal enterprise, is independent of worldview; 
however, in relation to the person who does the science and the influence of his 
or her background, science can be said to have a worldview. 
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African Worldview (Logic) and Science in Africa 
Like the discussion on whether there is an African philosophy or not, there has 
been a debate on whether there is an African science or not. This section of this 
paper joins the position of scholars who have argued for an African science, and 
the basis which this piece provides for the possibility of an African science is the 
African logic. It is the African logic that shapes what Ezeabasili (1977) refers to as 
the “African account of nature and how it works” (p. xi), or what in the 
contention of Murfin (1992) is Africa’s attempt to unfold the truth in nature. The 
idea of an African attempt to unfold the truth in nature or give an account of the 
workings of their universe points to the pluralism in science, involving the 
inquiries of systematic cultures. 
 
One of the pillars on which science stands, as seen in the work of Gauch (2007), is 
logic. It is also logic that gives and directs the scientific process and findings. It is 
at the point of logic which is embedded in the African worldview that the 
African worldview makes its distinctive impact on science in Africa. Speaking of 
African logic, the focus is on the structure of African thought. Every culture or 
people have their own peculiar way of thinking or reasoning, and it is the 
African pattern of reasoning that has led to an investigation into the African 
logic. Speaking on the diversity of logic, Momoh (1989) relates logic to human 
language which differs from culture to culture:  
In everyday usage of natural language we talk of a person as 
being logical if he is reasonable, sensible and intelligent; if he can 
unemotionally and critically evaluate evidence or a situation; if 
he can avoid contradictions, inconsistency and incoherence, or if 
he can hold a point of view argue for and from it, summon 
counter-examples and answer objections. (p. 174). 
 
The adjective ‘African’ attached to the word ‘logic’ speaks of the context or the 
locus of logicality. It is the application of reason to the world and culture of the 
African people (Kanu, 2017). There are two implications to this: 
 
First, it sees logic as a universal phenomenon. This is very important, since logic 
is a fundamental ingredient of the human person whose thoughts and thinking 
are organized, analyzed and sustained by some intrinsic structures that make the 
way for a systematic conception of reality. This being the case, it can be said that 
logic is thus a necessary element of every culture. There is no culture that does 
not accommodate a good argument, especially as it concerns their conclusions. 
Whether in Africa or in Europe or in America or in Asia, if the assumption of an 
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argument is true, the conclusion of the argument would always be true. For 
instance: 
 
If Njoku is an African philosopher,  
then Njoku is a great African thinker, 
Njoku is an African philosopher,  
Therefore, Njoku is a great African thinker  
 
If Kanu is shorter than Emeka,  
then Kanu should be taller than Usman 
Kanu is taller than Emeka 
Therefore, Kanu is taller than Usman 
 
These are arguments that are logical and cannot be accepted in one culture and 
rejected in another culture. Their conclusions are all acceptable as their 
assumptions are true. Thus, the principles of logic are universal principles that 
could be generally applied to diverse situations, no matter where. They are, thus, 
topic-neutral and con-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any 
accidental features of the world.  
 
Second, there is the particularity of logic, by which  is meant the context in which 
logic is applied. It speaks of the worldview which differs from one place to 
another; this bears on the universal application of logic. While logic is universal, 
it is clear knowledge that the cultural experiences of people  are meaningful 
within the context of an organized language that points to a logical ability- it is a 
people’s language that communicates their logical world. It is in this regard that 
Kuhn (1962), in his incommensurability theory, speaks of competing paradigms 
without a common measure, and Feyerabend (1981) holds that there does not 
exist a single scientific method that we can agree on as the “events, procedures 
and results that constitute the sciences have no common structure” (p. 1). 
 
Following from the construct of the African ontology which is complementary, 
African logic in general is complementary and integral in character, accepting the 
co-existence of opposing realities as complementary. It is based on its capacity 
for complementarity and openness to co-existence of opposing realities that it is 
described within the context of Igwebuike. Igwebuike is the modality of being in 
African philosophy. It is from the Igbo composite word and metaphor Igwebuike, 
a combination of three words. Therefore, it can be employed as a word or used as 
a sentence: as a word, it is written as Igwebuike, and as a sentence, it is written as, 
Igwe bu ike, with the component words enjoying some independence in terms of 
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space (2018a). The three words involved are: Igwe is a noun which means 
‘number’ or ‘population,’ usually a huge number or population. Bu is a verb, 
which means is. Ike is a noun, which means strength or power (Kanu, 2018b). Thus, 
put together, it literally means ‘number is strength’ or ‘number is power’. 
Beyond the literal sense, it speaks of otu obi (one mind and  one heart), asserting 
that when human beings come together in solidarity and complementarity, they 
are powerful or can constitute an insurmountable force or strength, and at this 
level, withstand the probabilities of life. Igwebuike is, therefore, an African 
philosophy of harmonization and complementation. It understands the world 
immanent realities to be related to one another in the most natural, mutual, 
harmonious and compatible ways possible (Kanu, 2016a&b). Thus, ‘to be’ is ‘to be 
with the other’, in a community of beings (Kanu, 2017a).  
 
The African worldview, therefore, is ruled by the spirit of complementarity, 
which seeks the conglomeration,  unification,  summation of fragmented 
thoughts, opinions and other individualized and fragmented thoughts and ideas. 
It understands reality within the context of the whole being greater than the 
corresponding parts. It is also a view that maintains that by the coming together 
of the individuals or parts, a viable and sustainable whole will emerge (Kanu, 
2017b). Because Igwebuike captures the dialectical character of African thought, it 
is referred to as African logic. And by dialectics, it is meant a method of 
philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between 
opposing sides. In African logic, there is the reliance on the contradictory process 
of opposing sides, though in a unique manner. For instance, day is vivified and 
complemented by night, and good by evil.  The adage that “Abasi obot mbat, abot 
udara ikpat,” meaning “the God who creates mud made available something to 
wash off the mud”, explains this fact of the complementarity of contradictory 
realities.  The two realities – “mud” and “water” – are mutually opposed, but are 
two sides of the same coin.  Anyanwu (1981) describes this contradictory 
dialectics as the “inner curve of reciprocity” (p. 87) that makes African 
epistemology to avoid the dualism of subjectivism and objectivism. The 
contradictory dialectics is not negative but affirms the functionality of differences 
as essential and incomplete dimensions of the whole. 
 
The Openness of African Science  
The Nri hegemony and its influence on Igbo history cannot be over-emphasized. 
Thus, Madubuko (1994) observes that the story of the Igbo, no matter how briefly 
considered, would be incomplete if one omits the Eri-Nri contribution. Afigbo 
(1981) shows Eri clan as originating from the regions of Anambra River, at 
Aguleri; from there they fanned eastward and established various communities. 
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In a discourse of this kind on African science and technology, knowing full well 
the place that Nri myth occupies in Igbo history, religion and culture, it would 
not be out of place to search beyond the surface of the mythology of Nri to 
discover profound ‘senses’ of African science and technology. 
 
The myth has it that Eri is the father of all Nri; and tradition says that he came 
from Chukwu. It is reported that the earth was not firm when he came to the 
world. To solve the problem of flood, he employed blacksmiths from Awka to 
use their bellows to dry the flooded land (Uzukwu, 1988). That Eri, the father of 
all Nri who came from Chukwu, needed blacksmiths from Awka to use their 
bellows to dry the earth already shows the dialogue between philosophy, 
religion and science. In spite of the fact that Chukwu, with all His wisdom and 
knowledge, would allow for his son to employ the help of these traditional 
scientists and technologists,  the fact is established that science and technology 
are also part of His divine arrangement for the human person achieving his 
purpose in life, and thus, does not contradict the divine purpose, if employed in 
proper perspective. Within the context of Igwebuike philosophy of science, in 
spite of the fact that philosophy religion and science deal with different aspects 
of human life and the existence of the universe, these areas of study achieve their 
full potentials only when they collaborate with other areas of study.  
 
This notwithstanding, there are two major implications that can be drawn from 
this myth in relation to the African concept of science.  
 
1. Science as an independent dependent Worldview 
There is a seeming categorization of worldviews into different types. Freud 
(1933) categorized worldview into religious or philosophical and rational or 
scientific worldviews and understands the categories are completely 
independent from each other. Irzik and Nola (2009) made categorization of 
worldviews into religious, philosophical, political, cultural, scientific, etc. These 
categorizations are done in a manner that poses that these worldviews are 
antagonistic to  one another. Obviously, science is a special cognitive activity 
aimed at objective and systematic knowledge about reality, different from 
religion which is based on faith or mystical experience, and also different from 
philosophy which studies the fundamental characteristics and principles of 
reality. In spite of their uniqueness as areas of study with different interests, 
there is always a meeting point, where  an aspect of one influences or flows from 
the other. 
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The categorization of religious worldview that is differentiated from others on 
the basis of the predominance of the belief in a universal spirit: God, deity or 
divine entity, in which the divine entity has established a moral order which is 
known to human beings, and human beings have a moral duty to obey it as it has 
future consequences in relation to life after death, with a comprehensive 
perception of the world. Under this categorization, you find the mythological 
worldview, especially when it uses myths, folklore or legends believed to be 
supernatural and true for the interpretation of nature, universe, events and 
humanity. The distinction between religious and mythological worldviews, not 
withstanding, a mythological worldview can also be a religious worldview.  
Non-religious worldviews also include the philosophical worldview, which uses 
logical reasoning, mathematics and speculation to interpret and provide answers 
to fundamental questions about reality. The third is the scientific worldview, 
which uses the premises and findings of science in explaining the meaning of 
life, morality, creation, etc. Although it is more exact and authentic, it does not 
provide meaning to existence as it is limited to the material realm. 
 
The researcher’s argument is that a scientific worldview can still have elements 
of religious beliefs. The fact that a person is a scientist does not necessarily mean 
that the person ceases to have a religion. One can be a Christian or a Muslim and 
still be a scientist. More so, science can still emerge from a worldview that is 
dominated by religious perspectives. This is very important because the African 
worldview is highly considered to be a religious worldview. If understood 
purely as a religious worldview, then it would be incapable of science and 
technology. And yet science emerges from the African worldview. It is on this 
basis that the researcher argues that worldviews are not independent but 
dependent. Science itself is not an independent field of human inquiry as it 
requires other perspectives in the search for the meaning of life. It is, therefore, 
understood as an independent dependent worldview. This explains why Eri, the 
son of Chukwu, in spite of his rich religious and philosophical background, 
implored the help of Awka traditional scientists; in this, he showed that science 
complements philosophy and religion, and vice versa. 
 
2. The Human Person is Central to Science 
What compelled Heidegger to write on technology lies in his observation that 
“everywhere, man remains un-free and chained to technology”(p.287), a 
situation in which the more technology advances, the more it “threatens to slip 
from human control” (p. 289). This adversely has affected the ordering of the 
world - in fact, disordering the world. As a result, a questioning of technology 
became necessary and urgent for Heidegger. Balancing his critique of technology 
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further, Heidegger (1966) thinks that there is the possibility of the use of 
technology in such a way that it would further the being of man: 
We can use technical devices, and yet with the proper use also keep 
ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them at any time.... We can 
affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the 
right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature.... I 
would call this comportment toward technology which expresses “yes” 
and at the same time “no,” by an old word, releasement toward things (p. 
54). 
 
From the myth of Nri, when Eri called the blacksmith to come and help him 
move the water away with their scientific and technological expertise, the myth 
only resounds that science and technology is relevant only to the extent that it 
helps the human person to advance and preserve his life. This is based on the 
fact that the Igwebuike worldview is anthropocentric. Man is at the centre of the 
universe. Mbiti (1970) asserts that “Man is at the very centre of existence and 
African people see everything else in its relation to this central position of man… 
it is as if God exists for the sake of man” (p. 92). Corroborating  Mbiti’s assertion, 
Metuh (1991), avers that “Everything else in African worldview seems to get its 
bearing and significance from the position, meaning and end of man” (p. 109). 
The idea of God, divinities, ancestors, rituals, sacrifices etc.,  is only useful to the 
extent that they serve the needs of the human person. Science is, therefore, meant 
for man and not man for science and technology.  
 
Heidegger’s argument against modern technology is that it looks at realities that 
do not conform to the standard of calculability and utility with suspicion, and 
addresses such as mere myth or superstition (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002). 
Heidegger (1977) describes this as a challenge that “puts to nature an 
unreasonable demand that it supply energy, which can [then] be extracted and 
stored” (p. 296).  
The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the 
sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth 
and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the 
field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which 
sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture 
is now the mechanised food industry. Air is now set upon to yield 
nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium 
is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for 
destruction or for peaceful use (p. 15). 
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He argues that modern technology ‘enframes’ nature only to capture it; that is, it 
sees nature merely as a valuable material resource to be extracted, expropriated, 
and used-up for whatever man desires or wills of it.  Under conditions of 
modern technology, “the earth,” as Heidegger (1977) notes, “reveals itself as 
[only] a coal mining district, [its] soil as a mineral deposit” (p. 296).  He believes 
that modern technology sees the world as an energy resource, a thing to be used, 
what he describes as a “standing-reserve” (p. 309).  
 
Taking from the African complementary perspective of reality, nature is not just 
as a thing to be exploited; nature is part of a whole to which we belong  as 
human beings. The exploitation of nature by science and technology is the 
exploitation of oneself because one belongs to nature as one is a part of nature. 
Thus, to treat nature with respect is to treat oneself with respect, and to treat 
nature without respect is to treat oneself without consideration and respect. 
More so, science and technology is meant to advance the freedom and humanity 
of the human person, and not to bring about human slavery. 
 
Conclusion  
Ozumba (2004) observes that every society has its own stock of epistemological 
thoughts, methods and worldviews. This assertion is fundamental to 
epistemology as the quest for knowledge is part of human nature; and thus, it is 
the prerogative of every culture or tradition. Like every other people, the African 
has his/her  own method or means of acquiring knowledge, which is based on 
what Bacon (1952) calls the alphabets or forms of the world around him/her . 
Nature consists of alphabets or forms, and the discovery of these alphabets or 
forms of nature helps us to understand the multifarious complexities of the 
universe in which we live. Beneath the surface, Igwebuike philosophy of science 
understands science and technology as a collective achievement of the ‘art of the 
human mind’ and the ‘artifice’ involved with the purpose of generating a new 
order upon nature. The understanding of the dynamics of the alphabets or forms 
of nature involved in the process equips us better in the transformation of bodies, 
as these forms (the art of the mind and the artifice) are the determinants of the 
fundamental structure of the world. 
 
A basic form or alphabet within the parameters of science and technology is the 
‘art of the mind’ which flows from the worldview of the scientist and the 
technologist. It is from the worldview that the artifice of the scientist or 
technologist emerges (that is, the pragmatic side of science and technology). The 
artifice, therefore, reveals the art of the mind. It is on the basis of the discovery of 
these forms that the discourse on Igwebuike philosophy of science and technology 
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is possible. The understanding of the nature of the forms involved in science and 
technology in Africa would help us understand the secret motions in the 
scientific and technological enterprise in Africa. In this, we see science and 
technology  in partnership with nature to provide human needs in an 
environment in which they must survive by sustaining the existential grid in a 
cooperative fashion.  
 
In discovering the forms of nature and the utilization of these forms for the 
betterment of human life, Igwebuike philosophy of science understands this 
pursuit or enterprise as a collaborative effort tailored towards the needs of the 
human person in a challenging universe. Since it is a collaborative effort, 
Igwebuike philosophy of science and technology does not in any way see science 
and technology as independent fields of human inquiry, but in a spirit of 
complementarity with other fields of human inquiry work towards the 
achievement of a balanced solution to human needs or problems. This is the 
complementarity that produces a scientific citizenship in philosophy,  which 
gives credence to a form of local knowledge.  It is only within this context that 
we are able to speak of an Igwebuike philosophy of science and technology. 
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